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ICEBERG HARVESTING: SUGGESTING A 
FEDERAL REGULATORY REGIME FOR A 
NEW FRESHWATER SOURCE 
CORY LEWIS* 
Abstract: The global freshwater shortage has already reached crisis levels. The 
World Health Organization and UNICEF estimate that there are over 700 million 
people in the world without access to clean drinking water. While this crisis con-
tinues to intensify, a massive, game changing source of freshwater is floating in 
the Arctic and Antarctic oceans, slowly melting away: icebergs. This Note ana-
lyzes the potential for harvesting icebergs as a freshwater source on a global 
scale. By focusing on and illustrating the legal status of icebergs on the high seas, 
this Note seeks to demonstrate why icebergs are res nullius—existing in a legal 
vacuum. Proceeding under the substantiated assumption that icebergs are res nul-
lius, this Note suggests that unilateral action by the United States is the most ef-
fective way to ascertain whether iceberg harvesting is, in fact, a practical solution 
to the global freshwater shortage. Further, if iceberg harvesting is established as 
such a solution, this Note suggests that unilateral U.S. action is also the most ef-
fective way to jumpstart an international iceberg harvesting industry. Finally, this 
Note proposes two regulatory options for how the U.S. Government can promul-
gate a legal regime to regulate a future iceberg harvesting industry. 
INTRODUCTION 
The World Health Organization and UNICEF estimate that there are over 
700 million people in the world without access to clean drinking water.1 This 
disastrous situation is likely to become even more dire, as the world is already 
experiencing the severe effects of freshwater shortages and drought.2 Drinking 
water shortages are not a problem unique to developing nations or third world 
countries; several western states in the United States have already experienced, 
                                                                                                                           
 * Editor in Chief, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2014–2015. The 
author would like to thank Jessica Alfano, Amal Bala, Colleen Maker, Benjamin Reilly and Brian 
Reilly for their continued guidance, commentary and support. 
 1 WORLD HEALTH ORG. & UNICEF, PROGRESS ON DRINKING WATER AND SANITATION—2014 
UPDATE 6–8 (2014), available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/112727/1/9789241507240_
eng.pdf?ua=1, archived at http://perma.cc/4GKM-H5KT. 
 2 See DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ET AL., GLOBAL WATER SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE COMMU-
NITY ASSESSMENT, at iii (2012), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Special%20Report_
ICA%20Global%20Water%20Security.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LW4A-PTCE; Millions Lack 
Safe Water, WATER.ORG, http://water.org/water-crisis/water-facts/water/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/PA5G-Y33K. 
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or are still experiencing, severe water shortages.3 The State Department re-
leased a report on World Water Day 2012 that brought the severity of the issue 
on a global basis into sharp focus.4 According to the report, the global demand 
for fresh water will exceed the available supply by forty percent by the year 
2030.5 
Icebergs might literally hold the solution to this endemic problem.6 An 
iceberg is a massive chunk of ice that has calved7 off of a continental glacier 
due to wave action and sub-glacial stress.8 Icebergs represent a substantial, 
constantly renewable,9 and potentially environmentally neutral untapped 
freshwater source.10 Approximately 75% of the world’s fresh water is held in 
ice, and of that volume, approximately 90% sits in the Antarctic.11 From its 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Norimitsu Onishi & Malia Wollan, California Watches Bad Drought Grow Worse, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2014, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/18/us/as-californias-
drought-deepens-a-sense-of-dread-grows.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4EFU-EZAT; U.S. Drought 
Monitor, NAT’L DROUGHT MITIGATION CTR., http://droughtmonitor.unl.edu/ (last updated Feb. 3, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/29EV-4KKU. 
 4 Steve Tracton, World Water Day: A Forceful Reminder That the U.S. Is Running Out of Fresh 
Water, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/capital-weather-gang/wp/
2013/03/22/world-water-day-a-forceful-reminder-that-the-u-s-is-running-out-of-fresh-water/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/535Q-BDE8. 
 5 See DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ET AL., supra note 2, at iii; Tracton, supra note 4. 
 6 See Cédric Simard, Turning Icebergs into Drinking Water?, DASSAULT SYSTÈMES: 3D PER-
SPECTIVES, (Oct. 15, 2010, 12:12 PM), http://perspectives.3ds.com/environment/turning-icebergs-
into-drinking-water/, archived at http://perma.cc/XAW2-KN65. 
 7 “[T]o separate or break so that a part becomes detached.” MIRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 163 (10th ed. 2001). 
 8 Christopher C. Joyner, Ice-Covered Regions in International Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 213, 
231 (1991). As of 1991, the largest iceberg ever sighted was 208 miles long and sixty miles wide. Id. 
at 231–32. 
 9 Thomas R. Lundquist, The Iceberg Cometh?: International Law Relating to Antarctic Iceberg 
Exploitation, 17 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 2 (1977); see JOHN L. HULT & NEILL C. OSTRANDER, ANT-
ARCTIC ICEBERGS AS A GLOBAL FRESH WATER RESOURCE 5–7 (1973), available at http://www.rand.
org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2008/R1255.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3BTN-QC4P. But see 
Press Release, Univ. of Leeds, Melting Icebergs Causing Sea Level Rise (Apr. 29, 2010) [hereinafter 
Leeds Press Release] (noting that a University of Leeds study has found that global warming is caus-
ing rapid melting of icebergs), available at http://www.leeds.ac.uk/news/article/793/melting_icebergs_
causing_sea_level_rise, archived at http://perma.cc/8DDE-VRHD. Because icebergs calve off of the 
Antarctic ice shelves at a consistent annual rate, they would be a renewable source of fresh water if 
harvested. Lundquist, supra, at 2. 
 10 Bryan S. Geon, Note, A Right to Ice?: The Application of International and National Water 
Laws to the Acquisition of Iceberg Rights, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 277, 279 (1997); see Lundquist, supra 
note 9, at 6–7. 
 11 HULT & OSTRANDER, supra note 9, at 5. The continent of Antarctica covers approximately 5.4 
million square miles, and on top of that land, approximately 29 quadrillion gallons of fresh water ice 
is generated annually, making the estimated total volume of ice in Antarctica 290 quintillion gallons, 
and counting. Id. By comparison, the area of the United States is approximately 3.8 million square 
miles—1.6 million square miles smaller than the area of Antarctica. Id.; State Area Measurements and 
Internal Point Coordinates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/state-area.
html (last revised Dec. 5, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/E2C4-RHBG.  
2015] Iceberg Harvesting: Suggesting a Federal Regulatory Scheme 441 
total volume of ice, Antarctica annually calves approximately 93% of the 
world’s total iceberg mass—an estimated 326 quadrillion gallons of freshwater 
in the form of icebergs.12 Further, nearly 5 quadrillion gallons of icebergs calve 
from the polar icecap annually; an amount which alone, if harvested, could 
satisfy the annual water needs of 5 billion people.13 
Towing an iceberg from one of the polar icecaps to a country in need 
might seem more like science fiction than a practical solution to water shortag-
es, but scientists, scholars and politicians have been talking about iceberg-
harvesting as a potentially viable fresh water source since the 1950s.14 Alt-
hough it has not yet been done, the increasing need for freshwater around the 
world, the continued abundance of icebergs15 and the advancing state of the 
technology and science16 that would be necessary to make iceberg harvesting 
possible, might soon expedite the practice.17 In fact, in 2011 French engineer 
Georges Mougin—the leader of the iceberg harvesting movement since the 
1970s—partnered with the design firm Dassault Systèmes to create a 3-D sim-
ulation of towing an iceberg from Newfoundland, nearly 3000 miles across the 
Atlantic Ocean, to the Canary Islands.18 The simulation suggests that it is en-
                                                                                                                           
 12 HULT & OSTRANDER, supra note 9, at v; Joyner, supra note 8, at 231; see infra note 47 and 
accompanying text. The United States uses an estimated 12 trillion gallons of water per day, which is 
over 4 quadrillion gallons of water per year. HULT & OSTRANDER, supra note 9, at 3. 
 13 Geon, supra note 10, at 279. Although not all icebergs can be utilized, this number is substan-
tial when considering that polar icebergs account for only seven percent of the world’s total concen-
tration. See id. 
 14 Id. at 279–80. Talks reached a high-point in 1977 when Saudi prince Mohammad al-Faisal 
funded a conference at Iowa State University—led by French engineer Georges Mougin—seeking to 
bring icebergs to Saudi Arabia. Id. 
 15 See Leeds Press Release, supra note 9. Global warming has actually led to more, not fewer, 
icebergs in the polar regions. Id. Despite the continued abundance, however, Professor Andrew Shep-
herd of the University of Leeds, who conducted the 2010 study, concluded that the overall global 
volume of floating ice is receding because icebergs are melting at a much faster pace. Id. 
 16 See infra notes 54–70 and accompanying text. 
 17 See Geon, supra note 10, at 281–82; Cédric Simard, How To: Tow an Iceberg Pt. 1, DASSAULT 
SYSTÈMES: 3D PERSPECTIVES (Apr. 18, 2011, 11:58 AM), http://perspectives.3ds.com/environment/
how-to-tow-an-iceberg-pt-1/, archived at http://perma.cc/X5Z8-QGVE; Cédric Simard, How To: Tow 
an Iceberg Pt. 2, DASSAULT SYSTÈMES: 3D PERSPECTIVES (May 9, 2011, 12:50 PM), http://
perspectives.3ds.com/environment/how-to-tow-an-iceberg-part-2/, archived at http://perma.cc/F3DA-
Z9BB; Cédric Simard, How To: Tow an Iceberg Part 3, DASSAULT SYSTÈMES: 3D PERSPECTIVES 
(May 16, 2011, 1:14 PM), http://perspectives.3ds.com/environment/how-to-tow-an-iceberg-part-3/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7TFM-ATWR. 
 18 David Zax, Watch a Tugboat Drag an Arctic Iceberg to Parched People Half a World Away, 
FAST COMPANY (May 31 2011, 1:15 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/1755444/watch-tugboat-
drag-arctic-iceberg-parched-people-half-world-away-video, archived at http://perma.cc/F7MA-Q44J; 
Interactive Map, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG., http://whc.unesco.org/
en/interactive-map/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/Q82F-R83Z. 
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tirely possible.19 Based on the successful computer simulation, Mougin’s team 
hopes to attempt a real-world tow in the very near future.20 
If iceberg harvesting became a reality tomorrow, the practice would oper-
ate in a legal vacuum.21 In all likelihood, because of the lack of a current ice-
berg harvesting market, neither the international community nor any individual 
nation has promulgated laws or regulations expressly designed to regulate the 
process.22 Several legal scholars have addressed this potential legal vacuum 
within the context of towing and harvesting Antarctic icebergs.23 Due to the 
volume of icebergs in Antarctica, and the scientifically based prediction that 
Antarctic waters are the most likely source of tabular, harvestable icebergs, this 
Note will continue with the same practical approach.24 Unlike prior legal 
scholarship, however, this Note acknowledges the potential legal vacuum that 
has already been identified, and then considers how to avoid it, or at least min-
imize its effect on the growth of iceberg harvesting as a new natural resource 
industry.25 
If the U.S. Government were to take the view that icebergs are legally 
free for the taking, it would be free to proceed with iceberg harvesting opera-
tions and regulation thereof, without interference from any national or interna-
tional regulatory body.26 Further, if the United States were to get involved, the 
resulting regulation might protect U.S. interests.27 This Note seeks to identify 
the optimal regulatory necessities of a comprehensive federal iceberg harvest-
ing legal regime.28 Further, it explores existing federal laws and bodies that 
could incorporate such a regime, and suggests two regulatory approaches for 
facilitating, continually supporting, and controlling a robust iceberg harvesting 
industry.29 
                                                                                                                           
 19 Simard, How To: Tow an Iceberg, Part 3, supra note 17; Zax, supra note 18. 
 20 Zax, supra note 18. The Dassault Systèmes three dimensional model was run in 2011, but a 
real tow has yet to occur on a large scale. See id. 
 21 Geon, supra note 10, at 282; see Joyner, supra note 8, at 232. 
 22 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 232; Geon, supra note 10, at 281–82. 
 23 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 232; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 7–26; Geon, supra note 10, at 281. 
The focus on Antarctica is due to the fact that Antarctic icebergs possess the largest potential source 
of harvestable freshwater. See Joyner, supra note 8, at 232; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 7–26; Geon, 
supra note 10, at 281. 
 24 See WILLIAM F. WEEKS & WILLIAM JOSEPH CAMPBELL, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, 
ICEBERGS AS A FRESH WATER SOURCE: AN APPRAISAL 1–2 (1973); Joyner, supra note 8, at 231. 
 25 See infra notes 109–300 and accompanying text. 
 26 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 232–34; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 23. 
 27 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 232–34; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 23. 
 28 See infra notes 30–321 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 109–300 and accompanying text. 
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The idea of towing an iceberg across the world to bring freshwater to 
places in need has been around for approximately sixty years.30 In 1977, Prince 
Mohammad al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia sponsored the first large-scale confer-
ence on iceberg utilization, which was named the First International Confer-
ence and Workshops on Iceberg Utilization for Fresh Water Production, 
Weather Modification and Other Applications.31 Led by French engineer 
Georges Mougin—who is still working towards his dream of towing an ice-
berg—the conference sought to identify and discuss the technological, eco-
nomic, political, legal and practical obstacles of iceberg harvesting, with the 
goal of turning the arid desert lands of Saudi Arabia into arable, fertile lands.32 
Although the conference ended in disagreement over the eventual possibility 
of towing an iceberg and was overshadowed by the specter of the massive pro-
jected cost,33 the concept remained alive.34 
In 2011 Mougin partnered with the French firm Dassault Systèmes to uti-
lize its advanced 3D modeling systems.35 Using the Dassault Systèmes model-
ing technology, declassified satellite data and the relatively new science of 
oceanic forecasting, Mougin’s team ran a successful computer simulation, sug-
gesting that iceberg harvesting is now a real possibility.36 The simulation even 
gave rise to a national commercial advertising campaign by Dassault Sys-
tèmes, which prominently features visual graphics of the simulation.37 
As of the date of this publication, an iceberg has yet to be towed and har-
vested.38 Mougin’s successful simulation and the ever growing global need for 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Geon, supra note 10, at 279. See generally Jerry Rosenberg, An Overview of the Organization-
al, Management, Economic and Socio-Political Aspects of Transporting Icebergs from Antarctica to 
the United States, in ICEBERG UTILIZATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE HELD AT AMES, IOWA 616 (Abdo Husseiny ed., 1978) (providing an overview of the substan-
tive concepts discussed at the conference, and more broadly, of the issues that were identified by peo-
ple thinking about iceberg harvesting in the 1970s). 
 31 Geon, supra note 10, at 279–80. 
 32 See id.; Zax, supra note 18. 
 33 See Lundquist, supra note 9, at 5–6. 
 34 Iceberg harvesting ideas have been floated several times since the conference, such as in 1980, 
when an inventor from California proposed a self-propelled iceberg, and in 1992, when the British 
National Rivers Authority considered, but ultimately rejected, a towing plan. See Geon, supra note 10, 
at 280–81. 
 35 Zax, supra note 18. 
 36 By utilizing advanced technologies and a sophisticated understanding of tides and currents, the 
simulation would be generally successful under a wide variety of conditions. Id. 
 37 Digital Frontier, IceDream - IFWE by Dassault Systèmes, YOUTUBE.COM (May 9, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PL5blnAH9xw, archived at http://perma.cc/W874-JTNW. 
 38 See Zax, supra note 18. This article was published in 2011, but no new evidence of a successful 
tow exists to date. 
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freshwater, however, point to the increasing possibility that iceberg harvesting 
could become a common practice in the near future.39 
II. TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
Icebergs are the world’s largest untapped freshwater source.40 Because it 
is estimated that the Antarctic waters contain up to ninety-three percent of the 
planet’s iceberg concentration, a technical and economic analysis of iceberg 
harvesting operations in the Antarctic is the most practical model to explore.41 
In order to conceptualize this approach, it is helpful to first understand what 
icebergs are.42 
Much of the land in both the Arctic and in Antarctica is covered with 
massive continental glaciers.43 As snow falls on these ice sheets, it compounds 
onto itself and eventually compresses the underlying snow into an ice-like 
form.44 Concurrently, the continental glaciers perpetually move outward to-
wards water, where the compacted snow eventually calves from the ice shelf 
and floats out to sea.45 When the icebergs calve off, they slowly drift out to-
wards the open ocean and melt over an average span of ten years.46 Antarctica 
alone calves an estimated 326 quadrillion gallons per year—equal to approxi-
mately 500 million average-sized Olympic swimming pools, or approximately 
92 billion Boeing 747-400 Freighter jets full of water.47 Where the average 
human being consumes approximately 52,834 to 79,251 gallons of water per 
year, Antarctic icebergs contain enough fresh water to supply four to six bil-
lion people per year.48 It is estimated that the total annual yield of icebergs 
calved off of Antarctica would be sufficient to irrigate 250 million or more 
acres of land.49 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Geon, supra note 10, 281; Millions Lack Safe Water, supra note 2; Zax, supra note 18. 
 40 See Mass. Inst. Tech., Glacial Icebergs: Sources of Freshwater, MISSION 2012 CLEAN WATER, 
http://web.mit.edu/12.000/www/m2012/finalwebsite/solution/glaciers.shtml (last visited Feb. 5, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/V9KT-FYZ5. 
 41 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 231. 
 42 See HULT & OSTRANDER, supra note 9, at 7; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 2. 
 43 Joyner, supra note 8, at 213–14. 
 44 Lundquist, supra note 9, at 2. 
 45 Id. 
 46 HULT & OSTRANDER, supra note 9, at 5–7. Drifting icebergs have an average melt rate of one 
to ten meters of volume per year, which indicates the potential longevity and durability of an iceberg 
being towed across the world. See id.; infra notes 54–70 and accompanying text. But see supra note 9 
and accompanying text (discussing the effect of global warming on transitory iceberg’s melt rate). 
 47 HULT & OSTRANDER, supra note 9, at 7. The number presented by Hult & Ostrander, 1.2 x 
1015 kg, is the equivalent of 3,170,064,614,900,000 U.S. gallons of water. See id. To provide a point 
of reference, the average Olympic sized swimming pool is 660,000 U.S. gallons, and a Boeing 747’s 
cabin can fit approximately 3456 U.S. gallons of fluid. 
 48 Id. at 8–9. 
 49 Id. at 5–7. 
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The following outline of the technical, economic, and environmental im-
plications of iceberg harvesting provides the basic, non-legal contextual infor-
mation that will need to be further explored if iceberg harvesting operations 
ever begin.50 Although these issues are critical considerations for any future 
iceberg harvesting legal regime, they are addressed in this Note in a very basic 
way, and would have to be addressed comprehensively by appropriate experts 
in the future.51 Further, it is unlikely that iceberg harvesting will ever become a 
common practice unless a substantial amount of startup investment, research, 
and analysis is done.52 As such, this Note proceeds under the assumption that 
the legal regime suggested would be able to adequately address these issues.53 
A. Is Towing an Iceberg Thousands of Miles Actually Possible? 
Through the use of modern science and technology, it appears that towing 
an iceberg from one of the polar-regions to a warmer climate across the ocean 
is possible right now.54 The issue of the technical practicability of towing an 
iceberg can be broken down into four parts: (1) locating a suitable source and 
supply; (2) calculating the necessary towing power requirements; (3) accurate-
ly predicting and accounting for in-transit melt; and (4) estimating the econom-
ic feasibility of the entire endeavor.55 Not just any iceberg can be towed and 
harvested.56 Due to the massive size, weight, and density of an iceberg, there is 
a great risk of one rolling over while being towed.57 As such, rectangular ice-
bergs with tabular58 shapes—that have a similar draft, or underwater shape, to 
that of a ship—are the most desirable.59 The Arctic tends to produce fewer tab-
                                                                                                                           
 50 See WEEKS & CAMPBELL, supra note 24, at 1. Weeks & Campbell’s study was conducted in 
1973, and thus it is likely that the scientific and economic data relied on would need to be revisited. 
See id. 
 51 See generally infra notes 54–108 and accompanying text (identifying the issues that will need 
to be addressed). 
 52 See Lauren E. Shaw, Asteroids, the New Western Frontier: Applying Principles of the General 
Mining Law of 1872 to Incentivize Asteroid Mining, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. 121, 133–36 (2013) (dis-
cussing the prefatory factors that are necessary to incentivize a natural resource industry where one 
does not yet exist). 
 53 See infra notes 240–300 and accompanying text. Such issues are crucial to the potential crea-
tion and success of an iceberg harvesting industry and will need to be properly addressed before any 
operation can proceed. See infra notes 240–300 and accompanying text. 
 54 See Zax, supra note 18. 
 55 WEEKS & CAMPBELL, supra note 24, at 1. 
 56 See id. 
 57 See generally id. (discussing the science behind towing an iceberg). 
 58 MIRIAM WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 1195 (defining tabular as “having a flat 
surface”). 
 59 WEEKS & CAMPBELL, supra note 24, at 1–4. 
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ular icebergs, and thus the primary source of suitable specimens is projected to 
be the Antarctic.60 
Once a suitable iceberg is chosen,61 one must confront the great logistical 
challenges presented by transporting a massive block of ice across an ocean.62 
In a study done in 1973 by John Hult and Neill Ostrander (“Hult & Ostrand-
er”), the feasibility of towing an iceberg from the Ross Ice Shelf in Antarctica 
to Southern California was considered.63 Their concept was to herd multiple 
icebergs into a procession that would use a combination of propulsion and the 
ocean currents to tow icebergs from Antarctica to California without experi-
encing so much melting that the purpose would be defeated.64 They proposed 
using a sophisticated array of propulsion methods, including attaching shroud-
ed propellers onto the icebergs themselves and wrapping the icebergs in waf-
fled plastic covering the entire underside to prevent excessive melting.65 
More recently, Georges Mougin’s team used innovative technology and 
science66 to capitalize on the Hult & Ostrander study’s basic concepts, leading 
to a successful 3-D computer simulation of a large-scale tow.67 Mougin’s team 
also accounted for the previously unaddressed issues of the traction force gen-
erated by the tugboat, fuel consumption, air and water drag against the iceberg 
and the tug, and even the Earth’s rotation.68 Although the issue of melt-rate is 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Id. at 1. By using declassified satellite data and information gathered by the International Ice 
Patrol of the U.S. Coast Guard, locating suitable icebergs and reaching their location is more practical 
now than it has ever been. See About International Ice Patrol (IIP), U.S. COAST GUARD NAVIGATION 
CTR., http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=IIPHome (last updated Dec. 23, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/HJ4B-WH4R. Antarctic icebergs become an even more attractive source when the 
U.S. Coast Guard’s well-established presence in Antarctica is taken into consideration. Id. 
 61 See JOHN L. HULT & NEILL C. OSTRANDER, APPLICABILITY OF ERTS FOR SURVEYING ANT-
ARCTIC ICEBERG RESOURCES 1 (1973), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
reports/2008/R1354.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S2KQ-8Z4P. This more advanced Hult & Os-
trander study proposed using Earth Resources Technology Satellites to locate and capture suitable 
tabular icebergs. Id. 
 62 See Lundquist, supra note 9, at 3. 
 63 HULT & OSTRANDER, supra note 9, at 16. 
 64 Id. at 10–16; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 3–4. 
 65 HULT & OSTRANDER, supra note 9, at 10–12. Further, the wrapping might be able to contain 
and insulate the water that did melt from the salt water. Id. 
 66 Zax, supra note 18 (noting that the study utilized declassified advanced satellite imagery, pro-
gressive meteorological and oceanographical techniques, and a sophisticated, modern understanding 
of ocean currents, swells, winds and bottom topography to design its successful simulated tow); see 
also Simard, How To: Tow an Iceberg, Pt. 2, supra note 17; Simard, How To: Tow an Iceberg, Part 3, 
supra note 17. Compare Zax, supra note 18 (demonstrating the modern science and technology used 
in Mougin’s study), with HULT & OSTRANDER, supra note 9, at 10–16 (demonstrating the state of the 
art technology in the late 1970s). 
 67 Zax, supra note 18; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text (illustrating the advanced 
technology that made Mougin’s simulation possible). 
 68 Simard, How To: Tow an Iceberg, Pt. 1, supra note 17. 
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still in question,69 climatologists and engineers believe that the modern techno-
logical and scientific advances available today have made iceberg towing a 
realistic option.70 
B. How Much Will It Cost to Tow an Iceberg Thousands of Miles? 
The projected costs of iceberg harvesting can be broken down into four 
components: (1) technological innovation; (2) iceberg identification and re-
trieval; (3) transportation; and (4) arrival site processing and distribution.71 
These costs must be competitive with those of alternative freshwater supply 
technologies for iceberg harvesting to be viable.72 Further, despite the massive 
global need for fresh water,73 there must be a market for the water in the region 
where the iceberg is delivered or the entire concept will be economically and 
practically unsustainable.74 
Although a recent financial analysis of the estimated yearly amortized 
capital investment necessary to run a harvesting operation has not been done,75 
the numbers arrived at by Hult & Ostrander, and by a similar study done by 
William F. Weeks and William Joseph Campbell (“Weeks & Campbell”) in the 
1970s, are worth noting.76 Using Weeks & Campbell’s more basic study, Hult 
& Ostrander ran a more comprehensive financial analysis.77 Based on their 
projections, an iceberg could be delivered at a cost of approximately $20 per 
acre-foot.78 Compared to the estimates for other options such as long-range 
inter-basin water transfer, at $50 to $60 per acre-foot range,79 or desalination at 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See generally John J. Helly et al., Cooling, Dilution and Mixing of Ocean Water by Free-
Drifting Icebergs in the Weddel Sea, 58 DEEP-SEA RESEARCH II 1346 (2011), available at http://ac.
els-cdn.com/S0967064510003668/1-s2.0-S0967064510003668-main.pdf?_tid=4aab770c-ad5c-11e4-
bcae-00000aab0f02&acdnat=1423157443_99e24d550dd47a3120daf7900b4df07d, archived at http://
perma.cc/X5BX-LXQY. Professor Helly is currently conducting an in-depth scientific study of ice 
melting rates in order to ascertain whether towing an iceberg from Antarctica is possible. Id. 
 70 Simard, How To: Tow an Iceberg, Part 3, supra note 17; Zax, supra note 18. 
 71 See Lundquist, supra note 9, at 3–5. 
 72 See WEEKS & CAMPBELL, supra note 24, at 15–16; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 3–5. 
 73 See DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ET AL., supra note 2, at iii. 
 74 See Lundquist, supra note 9, at 5–6. 
 75 See id. at 4–5. Lundquist foresaw that these numbers would need to be computed again in light 
of the economic circumstances present at the time when iceberg harvesting became a reality. See id. It 
is thus a distinct possibility that iceberg harvesting is no longer the cheapest and most efficient option 
to solve fresh water shortages. See id.; infra note 79–80 and accompanying text (discussing current 
cost estimates of inter-basin water transfer and desalination). 
 76 See HULT & OSTRANDER, supra note 9, at 38; WEEKS & CAMPBELL, supra note 24, at 15–16; 
Lundquist, supra 9, at 4–5. 
 77 HULT & OSTRANDER, supra note 9, at 37–38; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 5. 
 78 Lundquist, supra note 9, at 5. 
 79 Id. at 6 (citing C. HOWE & K. EASTER, INTERBASIN TRANSFERS OF WATER 169 (1971)). Inter-
basin water transfer is “the diversion of water from one water source basin to another.” BARBARA 
COSENS, THE WATER REPORT, NEW ERA OF INTERBASIN WATER TRANSFERS 21 (2010), available at 
http://www.infrastructureusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/twr-waterxfers.pdf, archived at http://
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an even greater cost of approximately $100 per acre-foot,80 iceberg harvesting 
would be a relative bargain.81 Further, it carries the potential for significant 
profit.82 
C. Potential Environmental Implications 
Fresh water is needed in all aspects of life.83 Along with being a necessity 
for human survival, fresh water plays a critical role in countless businesses and 
other commercial endeavors and in the continued survival of the planet’s di-
verse ecosystems.84 If iceberg harvesting were to prove successful, the envi-
ronmental benefits would be extensive.85 One could imagine the effect that an 
abundance of freshwater would have had on the state of Texas in 2011 when it 
experienced devastating drought, or in California, where severe drought and 
wildfires abound.86 Even more recently, if there had been an iceberg conven-
iently parked off the Atlantic coast, the effects of the chemical pollution of 
West Virginia’s water supply in late 2013 could have been significantly miti-
gated.87 Further, by introducing non-watershed-dependent sources of freshwa-
ter as an alternative to domestically situated freshwater, overly used domestic 
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/S6SE-ZLQ5. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), inter-basin water 
transfer is used to bring water to areas in need across the United States, and further, the practice is 
facilitated at the federal level through the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers. 
See id. In 2006, a study conducted by the Texas Water Development Board estimated the cost to de-
liver water through inter-basin water transfer in the Bedias Reservoir Interbasin Transfer to be $125 
per acre-foot. R.W. BECK, INC., SOCIOECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SELECTED INTERBASIN TRANSFERS 
IN TEXAS 4-2 tbl.4-1 (2006), available at https://www.twdb.texas.gov/publications/reports/contracted_
reports/doc/InterbasinTransfers_draft.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/48CQ-TJ9H. 
 80 Lundquist, supra note 9, at 6. In 2012, over forty years after Hult & Ostrander conducted their 
study, the Texas Water Development Board estimated that the delivery costs of desalinated water 
were anywhere between $357 to $1400 per acre-foot depending on the type and source of the saltwa-
ter. Desalination Facts, TEX. WATER DEV. BD., http://www.twdb.texas.gov/innovativewater/desal/
facts.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8PS4-99AU. 
 81 Lundquist, supra note 9, at 6. 
 82 See id. at v. 
 83 Protection of the Quality and Supply of Freshwater Resources: Application of Integrated Ap-
proaches to the Development, Management and Use of Water Resources, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T 
PROGRAMME, http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=52&articleid
=66 (last visited Feb. 5, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/S2BU-YXSV. 
 84 Said benefits would not just be due to the availability of a massive, renewable source of fresh-
water, but also to the existing sources of freshwater that would no longer need to suffer such pervasive 
and damaging overuse. See id. 
 85 See id.; Water Resources, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/learn-issues/
water-resources (last updated Oct. 17, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/A4GN-TPEU. 
 86 See Onishi & Wollan, supra note 3; Dan Huber, The 2011 Texas Drought in a Historical Con-
text, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS (Aug. 26, 2011, 1:15 PM), http://www.c2es.org/
print/blog/huberd/2011-texas-drought-historical-context, archived at http://perma.cc/ZD8F-CFDH. 
 87 See Kiley Kroh, The Complete Guide to Everything That’s Happened Since the Massive Chem-
ical Spill in West Virginia, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Feb. 9, 2014, 12:15 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/
climate/2014/02/09/3196981/chemical-spill-timeline/, archived at http://perma.cc/2MBJ-Z26E. 
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sources like the Colorado River, which is in danger of running dry because of 
overuse, could be relieved and rehabilitated.88 
There has been scant analysis of the potential adverse environmental ef-
fects during any phase of the iceberg harvesting process.89 As Thomas 
Lundquist pointed out, both the Weeks & Campbell study and the Hult & Os-
trander study “stressed the need for further environmental analysis before large 
scale operations are initiated.”90 Both studies posited that the most effective 
way to conduct such studies would be from the point of an iceberg’s origin to 
its point of destination.91 Thus, any future study should contain a consideration 
of (1) the impacts to the region of origin, (2) the transit-related impacts to the 
ocean and the climate, and (3) the delivery site impacts, from offshore pro-
cessing, to onshore processing and domestic distribution.92 
Both Weeks & Campbell and Hult & Ostrander predicted that the adverse 
environmental impacts in Antarctica would be minimal.93 As both of the stud-
ies were conducted in the 1970s however, the current accuracy of their as-
sumptions may be questionable.94 A more recent—albeit brief—commentary 
done by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), for 
example, suggested that pulling large quantities of icebergs out of the Antarctic 
has the potential to cause significant harm to Antarctic wildlife and ecosys-
tems.95 Further environmental impact analyses96 of the early stages of iceberg 
harvesting are plainly necessary.97 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See LOWER COLO. RIVER AUTH., INTENSE DROUGHT RIVALS WORST IN HISTORY (2014), 
available at http://www.lcra.org/water/water-supply/drought-update/Documents/IntensityofDrought.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/R7JG-4AY3; Press Release, Coop. Inst. for Research in Envtl. Scis., 
Today’s Worst Watershed Stresses May Become the New Normal, Study Finds (Sept. 18, 2013), 
available at http://www.colorado.edu/news/releases/2013/09/18/today%E2%80%99s-worst-watershed-
stresses-may-become-new-normal-study-finds, archived at http://perma.cc/EQE9-NCGC. 
 89 In large part due to iceberg harvesting not yet being practiced. Lundquist, supra note 9, at 6. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 See id. 
 93 See id. at 6–7. Despite the logical presumption that removing icebergs from an area would 
cause that area to warm, which in turn could lead to rising sea-levels and the attendant destruction that 
brings, Hult & Ostrander maintained that the predominant cooling factors in the Antarctic are the vast 
area of the sea and the continental ice mass, and not icebergs. See id. at 8. As such, as long as the 
appropriation process is controlled and regulated, towing icebergs—which have already separated 
from the primary continental shelf—out of the Antarctic should not have a warming effect on the area. 
See id. 
 94 See id. at 6. 
 95 Water from Icebergs, NAT’L. OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://oceanexplorer.noaa.
gov/edu/learning/player/lesson12/l12la1.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/
PR8R-NVW3. 
 96 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012). The 
type of analysis suggested should generally be the type required by NEPA. See id. 
 97 See Lundquist, supra note 9, at 6. In fact, a team of researchers lead by Professor John Helly at 
the University of California, San Diego and Scripps Institution of Oceanography concluded that the 
fresh water that drifting icebergs leave behind as they float north plays a significant role in the carbon 
450 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 42:439 
The most significant risks of adverse environmental impacts appear to be 
at the point of destination.98 Weeks & Campbell anticipated several tempera-
ture-induced effects such as increased fogging and rain from the thermal-
plume condensation coming off of a massive iceberg parked just off a coastal 
region.99 They further posited that the effect on local ecosystems and tides 
might be harmful.100 The more recent NOAA analysis suggested that the large 
amounts of very cold water melting off an iceberg could cause significant 
damage to the ecosystems it passes through.101 Further, when an iceberg reach-
es shallow enough water near its point of destination, the bottom could start to 
drag against the sea floor, crushing living communities there, stirring up mas-
sive amounts of dirt and debris and fundamentally and permanently altering 
the sea floor’s topography.102 At present, no study has adequately considered 
the primary and secondary impacts that iceberg harvesting would have once 
the ice reaches its onshore destination and is then distributed domestically.103 
Although Weeks & Campbell and the NOAA study are a start, neither is a suf-
ficiently detailed scientific analysis of the potential environmental effects of 
iceberg harvesting.104 
Due to the dearth of available information, any legal regime that purports 
to control and regulate iceberg harvesting in the future must thoroughly and 
exhaustively study the environmental impacts of the practice.105 The legal vac-
uum in which iceberg harvesting currently exists, however, has the potential to 
prevent a sufficient environmental analysis—such as an Environmental Impact 
Statement106—from being done.107 To the extent that iceberg harvesting be-
comes a common practice in the future, it is thus all the more important that 
such a regime be created.108 
                                                                                                                           
cycle of the Southern Ocean, suggesting significant environmental impacts that should be accounted 
for. See Press Release 11-059, Nat’l Sci. Found., Antarctic Icebergs Play a Previously Unknown Role 
in Global Carbon Cycle, Climate (Mar. 25, 2011), available at http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.
jsp?cntn_id=119058, archived at http://perma.cc/6ALJ-Z4KU. 
 98 The point of destination is the place where the iceberg is delivered, melted down, and distribut-
ed inland See Lundquist, supra note 9, at 7. 
 99 See id. 
 100 See id. 
 101 Water from Icebergs, supra note 95. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See supra notes 83–102 and accompanying text. 
 104 Lundquist, supra note 9, at 6. 
 105 See id. 
 106 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012). NEPA requires an Environmental Impact Statement for a federal 
action with the potential to harm the environment. Id. 
 107 See Lundquist, supra note 9, at 6; infra notes 193–212 and accompanying text. 
 108 See Lundquist, supra note 9, at 6. 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Antarctic iceberg harvesting presents a unique legal issue: there is no 
country, treaty, or law that controls it.109 Despite the widespread global need 
for fresh water,110 and a dwindling supply of available on-land resources,111 
there are presently no national or international legal schemes that expressly or 
implicitly control and regulate iceberg acquisition or harvesting.112 Although 
certain international conventions would probably have a significant influence 
on the operations of an iceberg harvester, the legal status of the practice re-
mains ambiguous and uncertain.113 Further, because icebergs are ultimately a 
limited resource that naturally occur in only a handful of ecosystems,114 the 
legal regimes that control the polar regions of the planet should be carefully 
considered.115 This Note will focus on Antarctic icebergs, as over ninety three 
percent of the world’s concentration of icebergs exists in the Antarctic re-
gion.116 
A. The Laws That Make Antarctic Icebergs Res Nullius 
There are two international agreements currently in force that may have 
legal implications regarding a nation’s or a private party’s right to obtain, tow 
and harvest an Antarctic iceberg.117 First, there is the Antarctic Treaty System 
(“ATS”), an international agreement that serves as the principal governing in-
strument over Antarctica.118 Second, there is the Law of the Sea: a centuries-
old concept that was codified into international law by the United Nations in 
1982 in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UN-
                                                                                                                           
 109 Joyner, supra note 8, at 232; Geon, supra note 10, at 282. 
 110 See Millions Lack Safe Water, supra note 2. 
 111 See DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ET AL., supra note 2, at 1–3; Sarah Zielinski, The Colorado 
River Runs Dry, SMITHSONIAN.COM (Oct. 2010), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/
the-colorado-river-runs-dry-61427169/?all&no-ist, archived at http://perma.cc/AW7L-CQ3Z. The 
Colorado River—the seventh longest in America—is at risk of drying up due to overuse and the ad-
verse effects of climate change. Zielinksi, supra. 
 112 Joyner, supra note 8, at 232; Geon, supra note 10, at 282. 
 113 Joyner, supra note 8, at 232; Geon, supra note 10, at 282. 
 114 See Geon, supra note 10, at 282. Although icebergs are ultimately a limited resource, there 
appears to be more than enough of them calved on an annual basis to serve the needs of an iceberg 
harvesting industry without reaching that limit. Id. 
 115 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 232–37; Geon, supra note 10, at 282–87. 
 116 See supra notes 40–82 and accompanying text. This limited focus, however, should not pre-
clude the applicability of the general principles discussed here to any operation, in any geography. See 
Geon, supra note 10, at 283. 
 117 Joyner, supra note 8, at 232–37; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 7–26; Geon, supra note 10, at 
282–87. 
 118 Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 42; see Joyner, supra note 8, at 
232–34; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 9–13; Geon, supra note 10, at 284–85. 
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CLOS”).119 The UNCLOS has been ratified by over 150 countries and the Eu-
ropean community, and only a small group of nations, including the United 
States, have refused to do so.120 
Collectively, the scholars who have addressed the legal vacuum in which 
iceberg harvesting exists agree that there are several potential ways to treat 
iceberg acquisition at the source within a legal context: as res nullius121 in light 
of the ATS and the UNCLOS; as private property under a national-sovereignty-
claim regime organized by recognized sovereign rights to Antarctic territory;122 
or as community property under a common-heritage-of-mankind scheme, thus 
treating icebergs as res communis,123 which would prompt the international 
community to appoint a steward such as the United Nations to control the in-
dustry.124 
Although each of these approaches might have merit, this Note will as-
sume that the first approach—legally defining Antarctic icebergs as res nullius, 
and thus ripe for the taking by any party—is currently the most legally 
sound.125 In so doing, it adheres to the prevailing notion that the legal interac-
tion between the ATS and the UNCLOS results in icebergs being res nullius 
because Antarctica has no territorial waters.126 Under the res nullius under-
standing of the legal status of icebergs, unless and until the international com-
munity creates a multilateral body to regulate iceberg harvesting, icebergs 
floating on the high seas are free for the taking.127 Defining icebergs as res nul-
lius, in turn, makes it possible for insular national regimes to regulate an indus-
try that appropriates them without offending other countries or international 
                                                                                                                           
 119 United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [here-
inafter UNCLOS], available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%201833/
v1833.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/AG9C-KKJK; Joyner, supra note 8, at 234–35; Lundquist, 
supra note 9, at 21–26; Geon, supra note 10, at 283–84. 
 120 United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 619 (D.Va. 2010) (noting that the United States 
has not signed or ratified the UNCLOS because of a disagreement over the deep seabed mining provi-
sions of Part XI of the treaty); SCOTT G. BORGERSON, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE NA-
TIONAL INTEREST AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 1, 3 (2009), available at http://www.cfr.org/oceans/
national-interest-law-sea/p19156, archived at http://perma.cc/57FN-FB3R. 
 121 Res nullius is “[a] thing that can belong to no one; an ownerless chattel.” BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 16c (10th ed. 2014). 
 122 See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 118, art. IV. There are no recognized sovereignty claims to 
Antarctica, making this system impractical. Id. 
 123 Joyner, supra note 8, at 235–37; see Brandon C. Gruner, Comment, A New Hope for Interna-
tional Space Law: Incorporating Nineteenth Century First Possession Principles into the 1967 Space 
Treaty for the Colonization of Outer Space in the Twenty-First Century, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 299, 
305–06 (2004). 
 124 Joyner, supra note 8, at 236; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 20–21. 
 125 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 234–35; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 21–26. 
 126 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 234–35 (noting that because the UNCLOS only recognizes territo-
rial waters for land that is recognized as sovereign territory, the ATS freeze on any claims of sover-
eignty precludes Antarctica from having territorial waters). 
 127 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 234–35; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 21–26. 
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laws.128 Such national regimes would also give the international community 
time to develop and institute a multilateral regulatory body.129 Unlike the other 
legal understandings, applying the concept of res nullius would require mini-
mal, or even no, new legislation.130 Further, because the effect of the conflu-
ence of the ATS and the UNCLOS is that there are no territorial waters sur-
rounding Antarctica, all of the water touching Antarctica’s coastline is legally 
high seas.131 Therefore, because icebergs are legally res nullius—not even the 
ATS and the UNCLOS control the appropriation of icebergs—iceberg harvest-
ing exists in a legal vacuum.132 
1. The Antarctic Treaty System (“ATS”) 
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959, which governs the area south of sixty de-
grees South Latitude,133 was created primarily to stem the discord caused by 
competing sovereignty claims over Antarctica’s territory.134 It has been signed 
and ratified by fifty countries to date,135 although it was originally comprised 
of the twelve nations with geographic sector claims or historic interests in Ant-
arctica.136 The parties to the treaty—referred to as the Antarctic Treaty Consul-
tative Parties (“ATCPs”)—meet biennially to maintain the ATS and to address 
any new or evolving issues.137 
The Antarctic Treaty consists of fourteen articles addressing various is-
sues, 138 such as maintaining the territory for peaceful purposes,139 guarantee-
ing scientific research freedom and an open exchange of information,140 and 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 234–35; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 21–26. 
 129 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 234–35; John G. Laylin, The Law to Govern Deepsea Mining 
Until Superseded by International Agreement, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 433, 435 (1973); Lundquist, 
supra note 9, at 21; Matthew Johnshoy, Note, The Final Frontier and a Guano Islands Act for the 
Twenty-First Century: Reaching for the Stars Without Reaching for the Stars, 37 J. CORP. L. 717, 722 
(2012). 
 130 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 234–35; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 21–26. 
 131 See infra notes 133–187 and accompanying text. 
 132 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 234–35; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 21–26. 
 133 An area south of all continental land masses, including the southern-most tip of South Ameri-
ca—Cape Horn, Chile—other than Antarctica. Joyner, supra note 8, at 214. 
 134 The sovereign claims of Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom overlap in substantial part, 
and no single claim is recognized as legally valid by any other country. Id. at 216; Lundquist, supra 
note 9, at 8–9. 
 135 SECRETARIAT OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE ANTARCTIC 
TREATY CONSULTATIVE MEETING AND THE COMMITTEE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 31–32 
(2014). 
 136 Those twelve nations are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, South Africa, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Lundquist, supra note 9, at 
8. 
 137 Joyner, supra note 8, at 214–15. 
 138 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 118, arts. I–IV. 
 139 Id. art. I. 
 140 Id. art. II, III. 
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freezing the status quo of territorial claims so that they remain in limbo—
perpetually undecided, and precluded from influencing any subsequent deci-
sion-making of the ATCPs.141 As such, as long as a nation is a signatory to the 
ATS, it cannot possibly have a legally recognized sovereign territorial claim to 
a discreet area on the Antarctic continent.142 Despite the relative success of the 
regime, several deficiencies prevent it from clarifying the legal status of ice-
bergs.143 First and foremost, the ATS does not contain any express provision 
regarding the exploitation of Antarctic resources.144 Further, pertaining to the 
competing, and in some cases overlapping, sovereignty claims, Article IV of 
the ATS freezes “the problem of sovereignty in the region by suspending de-
termination of the legal validity of any national jurisdictional claims to Antarc-
tica,” indefinitely.145 
The resulting combination of the original treaty ignoring resource exploi-
tation and the freeze on territorial sovereignty claims precludes seaward terri-
torial claims.146 As a result, some experts believe that there are no settled terri-
torial waters surrounding the coast of Antarctica, as defined by the UN-
CLOS.147 Because no nation can claim territorial sovereignty over any part of 
Antarctica, the UNCLOS defines the water touching Antarctica’s coastline as 
high seas.148 This Note will proceed under the presumption that this theory is 
sound.149 As such, icebergs should legally be considered res nullius, and thus 
free for the taking, without offending the ATS.150 
                                                                                                                           
 141 Id. art. IV. 
 142 See id. 
 143 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 233. 
 144 See Andrew N. Davis, Note, Protecting Antarctica: Will a Minerals Agreement Guard the 
Door or Open the Door to Commercial Exploitation?, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 733, 733 
(1990). Due to increased interest in various industrial concerns—especially those towards petrole-
um—and a major global interest in Antarctica’s mineral resource potential in the 1970s, the ATCPs 
embarked on a six-year negotiation process that led to the 1988 agreement on a mineral resource con-
trol regime called the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 
(“CRAMRA”), designed to supplement the 1959 Treaty (along with several other supplemental con-
ventions, which collectively constitute the ATS). Id. at 739–40. Despite the agreement, the CRAMRA 
never went into effect. Id.; see infra note 312 and accompanying text. 
 145 Joyner, supra note 8, at 216. 
 146 Id. at 233. 
 147 Id. at 234; see Lundquist, supra note 9, at 22–23. 
 148 See UNCLOS, supra note 119, arts. 87, 136; Joyner, supra note 8, at 234. This issue will be 
addressed in greater detail in the following section, covering the Law of the Seas. See infra notes 155–
187 and accompanying text. 
 149 See infra notes 150–300 and accompanying text. It is the only legal treatment that can be ap-
plied presently without amending the ATS articles and thawing the freeze on territorial claims, which 
is highly unlikely to happen. See infra notes 150–300 and accompanying text. 
 150 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 234. This presumption will be relied on for the remainder of this 
Note and will be justified in the following subsection. See, e.g., infra notes 151–321 and accompany-
ing text; see infra notes 155–187 and accompanying text. 
2015] Iceberg Harvesting: Suggesting a Federal Regulatory Scheme 455 
Because the ATS collectively contains no express or implicit legal scheme 
that clarifies the legal status of icebergs,151 it does not, in its current form, le-
gally control the status of icebergs floating off the coast of Antarctica, at any 
distance.152 This means that icebergs are a mineral resource153 beyond the au-
thority of the ATS, and thus outside the purview of any currently applicable 
restrictions the treaty might otherwise be able to place on an iceberg harvesting 
operation.154 
2. The Law of the Sea and the United Nationals Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (“UNCLOS”) 
The Law of the Sea dates back to sixteenth-century European imperial-
ism.155 For more than three centuries, Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius’ concept that 
the seas are free to all mankind has been almost universally accepted.156 In 
1945, despite such widespread acceptance of Grotius’ concept, President Harry 
Truman—largely in response to increased exploration for natural resources and 
extraordinary increases in the general uses of the ocean at the outset of the 
twentieth century—issued a proclamation (“The Truman Proclamation”) that 
the United States had the exclusive right to the mineral resources of its conti-
nental shelf.157 The Truman Proclamation led to nearly three decades of unilat-
eral national proclamations by countries other than the United States, which 
mimicked the United States in making exclusive sovereign claims to extra-
territorial, sub-surface property.158 In 1958, responding to the confusion and 
tension these claims caused, the major maritime powers of the world began the 
process of creating an international treaty to reestablish and codify the ancient 
law of the sea.159 Over the subsequent three decades, approximately 160 coun-
tries negotiated the Law of the Sea, and finally, in 1982, after four major U.N. 
conventions and countless negotiations, the UNCLOS was created.160 
The UNCLOS does not expressly control icebergs or iceberg harvest-
ing.161 The UNCLOS is, however, likely to have an effect on iceberg harvest-
                                                                                                                           
 151 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 232–34. 
 152 See id. 
 153 See FRANCISCO ORREGO VICUÑA, ANTARCTIC MINERAL EXPLOITATION: THE EMERGING 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 160 (1988). 
 154 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 232–34. 
 155 BORGERSON, supra note 120, at 6. Led by Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, the notion that the seas 
were the common heritage of all mankind beat out the competing claims of national ownership of vast 
swaths of the ocean by Spain and Portugal. Id. 
 156 Id. at 7. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
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 160 Id. at 3. 
 161 See UNCLOS, supra note 119, art. 136; Geon, supra note 10, at 283. It is likely that the ATCPs 
have simply not addressed the issue yet. See VICUÑA, supra note 153, at 159–60. The UNCLOS did not 
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ing.162 The most significant effect that it would have—specifically on the ac-
quisition of icebergs on the high seas163—is its recognition of territorial waters 
and the legitimacy of national sovereignty within them.164 The UNCLOS terri-
torial water regime creates four contiguous zones: Territorial Water; the Con-
tiguous Zone; the Exclusive Economic Zone; and the high sea.165 The UN-
CLOS has promulgated The Enterprise and the International Seabed Authority 
(the “EISA”) to control and manage the high seas.166 Although the EISA does 
not expressly cover icebergs, it abides by the principle that the high seas, and 
their contents, are the common heritage of mankind.167 As such, and in con-
junction with the freedom of the high seas doctrine that pervades the entirety 
of the UNCLOS, icebergs floating in the high seas may, under the UNCLOS, 
be freely harvested by any state or private party that wishes to do so.168 
In the specific case of Antarctic icebergs, the law of territorial waters169 is 
of particular importance, as it represents a critical intersection of the ATS and 
the UNCLOS.170 Article IV of the ATS freezes all sovereignty claims in Ant-
arctica.171 Because no territorial claims were officially resolved or recognized 
at the time the ATS went into force, the ATS Article IV sovereignty freeze ef-
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harvesting is currently being done, and thus that there is no immediate need for such a regime. See id. 
 162 See UNCLOS, supra note 119, at pts. II, V, VII, X, XII. 
 163 See id. arts. 87, 136. Article 87 establishes the freedom of the high seas, and Article 136 estab-
lishes that the high seas are the common heritage of mankind. Id. 
 164 See id. pt. II, arts. 3, 4, 33, pt. V, art. 55; JOSEPH F.C. DIMENTO & ALEXIS JACLYN HICKMAN, 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE OF THE GREAT SEAS: LAW AND EFFECT 17 (2012). 
 165 UNCLOS, supra note 119, pt. II, art. 136; see DIMENTO & HICKMAN, supra note 164, at 10. 
First, there is Territorial Water, which extends twelve miles out from a nation’s coastline. UNCLOS, 
supra note 119, pt. II, art. 4. Within a nation’s Territorial Water, it has absolute sovereignty, including 
complete legal jurisdiction. Id. pt. II, art. 2. Second is the Contiguous Zone, which extends another 
twelve miles beyond Territorial Waters, and thus twenty-four miles off the coast. Id. pt. II, § 4 art. 33. In 
the Contiguous Zone, the coastal state’s regulatory authorities for customs, fiscal transactions, immigra-
tion, management of wastes, and shipwrecks continue to govern. Id. Third is the Exclusive Economic 
Zone, which extends 176 miles beyond the Contiguous Zone, and thus 200 miles out from a Nation’s 
coastline. Id. pt. V, arts. 55–57. Should a nation chose to declare an Exclusive Economic Zone, it will 
have “sovereign rights for the purpose of . . . exploiting . . . the natural resources . . . of the waters super-
adjacent to the seabed . . . and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and explora-
tion of the zone . . . .” Id. pt. V, art. 56. Although icebergs are not explicitly mentioned in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone provision, they are natural mineral resources, and are thus generally considered to fall 
within the range of resources reserved to a state within its Exclusive Economic Zone. See Geon, supra 
note 10, at 283. Beyond Exclusive Economic Zone waters is the high sea, which is accessible to all man-
kind. UNCLOS, supra note 119, arts. 1.1(1), 87, 136 (illustrating the treaty’s underlying principle of the 
sea being the common heritage of all mankind). 
 166 UNCLOS, supra note 119, pt. XI, § 4, art. 156; see DIMENTO & HICKMAN, supra note 164, at 
17. 
 167 See DIMENTO & HICKMAN, supra note 164, at 17. 
 168 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 232–34. 
 169 See UNCLOS, supra note 119, pt. II, § 1, art. 2. 
 170 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 233–34; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 22–23. 
 171 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 118, art. IV. 
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fectively precludes any nation from claiming or enforcing territorial waters.172 
Otherwise stated, because no nation is technically the undisputed sovereign of 
any part of Antarctica, it is impossible for any nation to assert territorial sea 
rights.173 Based on this ambiguity at the intersection of the UNCLOS and the 
ATS, there are no territorial waters surrounding Antarctica, and thus icebergs 
floating therein are within the high seas.174 Accordingly, unlike the contents of 
the surrounding waters of any other claimed landmass in the world, the con-
tents of the unfrozen waters that touch the Antarctic coastline, which includes 
the Antarctic ice shelves, are res nullius.175  
The second pertinent aspect of the UNCLOS that would affect iceberg 
harvesting is a set of general principles called the freedoms of the high seas.176 
Among others, the freedoms of the high seas comprise the freedoms of naviga-
tion, fishing, laying submarine cables and pipelines and overflight.177 The 
freedoms of the high seas are recognized general principles of international 
law and are subject to the fundamental test of rational use.178 This test guaran-
tees the well-established high seas freedoms to all nations and people, and 
conversely prohibits all nations and persons from restricting the freedoms of 
other nations or persons.179 
These principles, although not expressly or directly controlling iceberg 
harvesting, serve as a limitation to any activity undertaken on the high seas.180 
For that reason, iceberg harvesting should be free to proceed under the UN-
CLOS, as long as it does not unreasonably interfere with other activities en-
compassed by the freedom of the seas.181 Under the reasonable use analysis,182 
iceberg harvesting operations would have to comply with international envi-
ronmental legal standards meant to preserve the ocean’s ecological health and 
to deter marine pollution, because not doing so is deemed an interference with 
reasonable use of the high seas.183 For example, the UNCLOS contains strict 
                                                                                                                           
 172 Joyner, supra note 8, at 233–34. 
 173 See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 118, art. IV; Joyner, supra note 8, at 233–34. 
 174 See infra notes 176–187 and accompanying text. Some commentators take a contrary position: 
that all activities conducted on the high seas are only permissible if they are explicitly allowed under 
international law or custom. See Geon, supra note 10, at 284. 
 175 Joyner, supra note 8, at 233–34. 
 176 Lundquist, supra note 9, at 24; see Joyner, supra note 8, at 234–35; see also Geon, supra note 
10, at 286–87 (discussing the establishment and evolution of general principles of international law). 
 177 UNCLOS, supra note 119, pt. VII, § 1, art. 87; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 24, n.125. 
 178 UNCLOS, supra note 119, pt. VII, § 1, art. 87; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 24, n.125. 
 179 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 234–35; Lundquist, supra note 9, at 25. 
 180 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 234–35; Geon, supra note 10, at 286–87. 
 181 See supra notes 176–179 and accompanying text. 
 182 See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 183 Joyner, supra note 8, at 234–35; see UNCLOS, supra note 119, pt. XII. The UNCLOS protec-
tion and preservation provisions codify the obligation of signatory states to ensure the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment and more specifically, control exploitation of natural re-
sources, prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment, prevention of the 
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environmental protection standards that could be enforced on iceberg harvest-
ing operations under the guise of the laws of reasonable use.184 Should iceberg 
harvesting operations be able to proceed without violating the fundamental test 
of reasonable use and the UNCLOS environmental provisions, it follows that 
iceberg harvesting would not offend the UNCLOS.185 
Finally, the iceberg harvesting activities of one country or private party 
“must be reasonable in relation to the harvesting needs and capabilities of oth-
er countries.”186 Although this will not be an issue for the foreseeable future, as 
not even one iceberg has been successfully towed and harvested, it is possible 
to foresee an over-exploitation problem arising if, and once, iceberg harvesting 
becomes common practice.187 
B. U.S. Federal Laws and Bodies That May Apply to Iceberg Harvesting 
The United States has three generally recognized rights with regard to in-
ternationally situated natural resources.188 It can (1) define and tailor the rights 
of its citizens,189 (2) enact legislation to regulate the industry, while also pro-
moting conservation and orderly development,190 and (3) act unilaterally in the 
absence of a previously established international regime.191 With these rights in 
mind, there are two practicable ways for the United States to act unilaterally to 
create and institute a national iceberg harvesting regime: it can either enact an 
entirely new law or it can incorporate such a regime into an existing federal 
legal scheme.192 
                                                                                                                           
transfer damage or hazards and the use of technology in the marine environment. See UNCLOS, supra 
note 119, pt. XII. 
 184 See UNCLOS, supra note 119, at pts. XI, §§ 1, 2 (presenting the principles governing the area 
of the high seas that is the common heritage of all mankind), XII (presenting the provisions for the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment). 
 185 See id. pts. XI, §§ 1, 2, XII. 
 186 Lundquist, supra note 9, at 25. 
 187 See id. Although this issue is thus beyond the scope of this Note, it is something that must be 
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 188 See Laylin, supra note 129, at 433–34; see also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584–85 
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States to acquire jurisdiction over previously unencumbered territory); Laylin, supra note 129, at 433–
34. 
 192 See Regular Coast Guard, 14 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 
U.S.C. §§ 1401–1473 (2012). Instead of using existing law, the U.S. Government chose to legislate an 
entirely new deep seabed mining statute. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1473. 
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1. The Model of the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act 
It is possible that Congress—if and when it addresses the legal vacuum in 
which iceberg harvesting currently exists—will choose to enact new, compre-
hensive legislation to regulate the industry.193 Should that be the case, the Deep 
Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (“DSHMRA”) provides a uniquely analo-
gous model of a U.S. federal law meant to control and regulate the exploitation 
of natural resources on the high seas.194 
Congress enacted the DSHMRA in response to the legal uncertainty sur-
rounding deep seabed mineral mining.195 At the time, the UNCLOS was in its 
infancy, and it was unclear how it would incorporate deep seabed mining.196 
Congress decided that the need for the minerals in the seabed was too great 
and immediate to wait for the international process to evolve.197 It enacted the 
DSHMRA, a comprehensive law that regulates deep seabed mining, including 
permitting, environmental protection and enforcement, and expressly qualifies 
the law as a temporary measure.198 
In the late 1970s, deep seabed mining was a popular idea.199 Much like 
iceberg harvesting, it was not entirely clear that it was possible in a way that 
would have made it both technically and economically feasible, and there was 
a great deal of legal uncertainty as to who had a right to mine the minerals, or 
if anyone did at all.200 American companies were seeking to extract deep sea-
bed minerals, and made it clear to Congress that the legal uncertainty sur-
rounding the practice was a cause for great concern.201 In response, the gov-
ernment first tried to jumpstart an international treaty.202 As the pressure from 
private industry continued to increase, however, the government decided to act 
unilaterally by adopting the DSHMRA.203 In addition to its operative provi-
sions, the DSHMRA was explicitly meant to be a temporary measure that 
                                                                                                                           
 193 See Laylin, supra note 129, at 437 n.7; Johnshoy, supra note 129, at 722 n.49. 
 194 See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1473 (illustrating a new and uncertain natural resource statute). 
 195 See id.; Johnshoy, supra note 129, at 722. 
 196 See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(13), (14); Johnshoy, supra note 129, at 722. 
 197 See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(13), (14); Johnshoy, supra note 129, at 722; see also Laylin, supra 
note 129, at 437 (acknowledging the immediacy of the situation in the 1970s and laying out a pro-
posed deep seabed mining statute). 
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 200 See id. 
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 202 Id. 
 203 30 U.S.C. § 1401; Johnshoy, supra note 129, at 721–22. The law authorized U.S. nationals to 
mine deep seabed minerals and gave them enforceable rights to protect their claim areas. Johnshoy, 
supra note 129, at 722. 
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would facilitate an emerging natural resource industry until a multilateral trea-
ty could be created and promulgated.204 Based on the situational similarities 
between deep seabed mining and iceberg harvesting—namely the exploitation 
of a natural resource resting beyond U.S. territory—the DSHMRA could be a 
model for iceberg harvesting.205 
Even though the DSHMRA was enacted as a temporary measure, it is, 
thirty-five years later, currently still in force.206 The DSHMRA and the UN-
CLOS treat mining claims in contradictory ways, which has caused significant 
apprehension among prospective miners.207 The legal uncertainty that resulted 
from mining operators’ lack of confidence in the legal security of their territo-
rial claims prevented significant investment, which then stunted the develop-
ment of the industry.208 But the harvesting of icebergs—floating on the high 
seas, unattached to any land and destined to melt into nothing—should not suf-
fer the same fate.209 This is so because the UNCLOS can only view icebergs as 
res nullius,210 which means there is no potential for the contradictory legal 
treatment that plagued the deep seabed mining industry.211 Further, as unat-
tached, drifting pieces of ice, which will eventually melt into the ocean, a 
claim to an iceberg is limited in duration and therefore not subject to another 
pitfall of the DSHMRA.212 
2. U.S. Coast Guard 
The U.S. Coast Guard is one of the five branches of the U.S. Armed 
Forces, and the only branch that is within the Department of Homeland Securi-
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 205 See Gruner, supra note 123, at 331 (noting that legal uncertainty over the security and perma-
nence of mining claims effectively blocked financial investment by making it overly risky); Johnshoy, 
supra note 129, at 735 (suggesting a unilateral bill from Congress, similar to the DSHMRA, to incen-
tivize the exploitation of extraterrestrial minerals). 
 206 Johnshoy, supra note 129, at 722, 729. By making deep seabed minerals the property of all 
mankind, the UNCLOS precludes U.S. mining claims established under the DSHMRA, which is the 
primary reason the United States has not ratified the treaty. UNCLOS, supra note 119, art. 136; see 
Johnshoy, supra note 129, at 729. 
 207 See Johnshoy, supra note 129, at 729 (noting that the DSHMRA recognizes a miner’s right to 
stake private territorial claims on the seabed, whereas the UNCLOS treats the seabed as res com-
munis—the community property of all mankind—and thus makes it unclaimable). 
 208 See id. at 722, 729. 
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ty.213 The Coast Guard’s primary mission is to protect the maritime and envi-
ronmental interests of the United States.214 It is a unique body because its 
“broad legal authorities, capable assets, geographic diversity and expansive 
partnerships provide a persistent presence along our rivers, in the ports, littoral 
regions and on the high seas.”215 The Coast Guard has eleven legally assigned 
official missions.216 Four of these missions would be critical to integrating an 
iceberg harvesting regulatory scheme into the Coast Guard: the duties of aiding 
navigation; promoting marine safety; marine environmental protection; and ice 
operations.217 Under the purview of these missions, the Coast Guard is granted 
a broad scope of authority and a flexible range of interpretive power.218 
Congress codified the primary duties of the Coast Guard.219 Through its 
congressionally mandated authority, the Coast Guard is meant to pursue and 
accomplish its aforementioned legal missions.220 Of these duties, three in par-
ticular grant the Coast Guard a broad range of enforcement and regulatory au-
thority.221 The Coast Guard is responsible for enforcing laws on the high seas, 
administering and promulgating laws on the high seas and generally facilitat-
ing and supporting activities that occur on the high seas.222 In particular, the 
catch-all provision in 14 U.S.C. § 2(3) enables the Coast Guard to devise and 
implement novel regulatory schemes quickly and without the need for the pas-
sage of a new law or an executive order.223 
Along with its primary duties, the Coast Guard has been congressionally 
assigned secondary duties.224 Of particular importance to iceberg harvesting is 
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its duty to enforce the Antarctica Conservation Act (“ACA”).225 In conjunction 
with the National Science Foundation (“NSF”), the Coast Guard is expected to 
broadly conserve and protect Antarctica in a manner consistent with the 
ATS.226 Under that mandate, the Coast Guard can theoretically invoke its re-
sponsibility with respect to the ATS to embark upon novel endeavors, as long 
as they are consistent with the general thrust of the treaty and particularly its 
environmental protection protocols.227 Further, in conjunction with the more 
general statutory grant of power, the ACA enables the Coast Guard to enact a 
permitting program to control any takings of moveable property in Antarcti-
ca.228 
Another critically important aspect of the Coast Guard’s role in enforcing 
the ACA is that any action taken in furtherance of its duty—domestically or 
internationally—must be done in compliance with the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”).229 As a result, the Coast Guard is required to 
comply with the Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) requirements of 
NEPA with regard to ACA enforcement.230 If the Coast Guard were to create 
and implement a permitting scheme that controlled the actual, physical act of 
taking of icebergs from the Antarctic Sea, it could do so without offending any 
international laws because the legal concept of icebergs being res nullius 
means that there are no such laws to offend.231 By seeking to control the envi-
ronmental impact that towing an iceberg out of the Antarctic might have on the 
ecosystem, the Coast Guard would not offend the notion that icebergs are free 
for the taking.232 Instead, it could recognize and accept the law of res nullius, 
but nonetheless require permitting to account for the effects the taking might 
have, but not for the taking itself.233 
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The Coast Guard has a standardized method for enacting new regula-
tions.234 When a rulemaking concept comes to the Coast Guard, it must be 
sponsored by a Program Technical Office (“PTO”) to eventually become a 
law.235 Once the decision has been made to sponsor a rulemaking, the chief of 
the sponsoring office submits a scoping document to the Coast Guard Regula-
tory Coordinator (“RegCo”).236 When the project has been accepted by RegCo, 
the process begins with the assignment of a team consisting of the following 
members: Regulations Development Manager; Technical Expert; Project 
Counsel; Economist; Environmental Analyst; Technical Writer; and additional 
experts as needed.237 The project team then formalizes a planned approach to 
the regulatory scheme and goes through an intensive research and preparation 
process that eventually results in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, several 
periods of public notice, a Final Rule and finally, after the Coast Guard Office 
of Management and Budget gives final approval, a Direct Final Rule.238 After a 
thirty-day phase-in period, the rulemaking becomes an enforced federal law.239 
IV. THE BENEFIT OF THE UNITED STATES ACTING UNILATERALLY INSTEAD 
OF WAITING FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY 
The history of the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act 
(“DSHMRA”) shows that a stable legal environment is an important aspect of 
successfully developing a new natural resource industry.240 For that reason, 
and because icebergs are res nullius, if the global need for freshwater reaches 
the point where it justifies the initial investment necessary to launch an iceberg 
harvesting industry, there should be a legal scheme in place that will facilitate, 
control, regulate and continuously monitor it.241 Although icebergs present a 
potentially massive, sustainable and lucrative source of freshwater, the entire 
process—from appropriation to delivery—is rife with environmental, legal and 
political dangers.242 As this Note has discussed, iceberg harvesting presents 
environmental risks from the point of appropriation to the point of destina-
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tion.243 In conjunction with these potentially harmful environmental effects, 
the legal uncertainty about how icebergs would be treated under the Antarctica 
Treaty System (“ATS”) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (“UNCLOS”)244 makes appropriation, transportation and delivery delicate 
subjects that might have a chilling effect on the development of the industry.245 
But iceberg harvesting presents a prospect for success that deep seabed 
mining did not have.246 The debate about deep seabed mining existed within 
the well-established and oft-used legal application of real property and interna-
tional sovereignty laws to terra firma claims.247 Iceberg harvesting, alterna-
tively, requires a novel application of those laws, and is therefore legally unset-
tled and open to various legal interpretations.248 Alternatively, no existing law 
controls iceberg harvesting and there is no present prospect for an international 
law—be it the ATS, the UNCLOS, or a new multilateral treaty—to incorporate 
the industry in the foreseeable future.249 For that reason, the United States 
should act to fill the void—much as it did with the DSHMRA—to meet the 
challenge of an iceberg harvesting industry head on.250 
A. An International Treaty Would Not Be Sufficient in the Immediate Future 
Although international negotiations represent a critical component of the 
ever-evolving body of international law, international treaties are slow in the 
making, cumbersome in their development and often ineffective once in 
force.251 The UNCLOS and the ATS demonstrate how complex, politically 
tangled and slow-moving international treaties can be.252 The legal uncertainty 
that could be created by waiting for an international treaty will likely have a 
chilling effect on the potential for iceberg harvesting to emerge as a viable in-
dustry.253 The pressing need for access to more freshwater254 makes taking this 
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risk imprudent.255 It would therefore be unwise for the United States to rely on 
either the ATS or the UNCLOS to incorporate iceberg harvesting—if and when 
it becomes a common practice256—or to hope that the international community 
will come together to create an entirely new treaty.257 
The United States should act now, as a stop-gap measure, and then, as it 
did with the DSHMRA, seek to promote a well-reasoned, un-rushed interna-
tional treaty that could eventually negate the need for the temporary law.258 
The legal vacuum that would occur if the United States chooses to wait for an 
international treaty, instead of acting affirmatively in lieu of one, might not 
only prevent iceberg harvesting from ever taking off,259 but also lead to dam-
aging environmental consequences.260 
If iceberg harvesting were to happen tomorrow, for example, there would 
be substantial confusion about who could control it.261 Harvesters could grab 
icebergs with impunity and without regard to the damage they might cause 
through uncontrolled techniques.262 This could lead to unnecessary harm to 
wildlife, damage to other tabular icebergs that could have otherwise been used 
and many other unforeseen environmental consequences in the Antarctic.263 
Further, once in transit, international enforcement authorities such as the Coast 
Guard would be unprepared to handle a super tugboat dragging a massive 
piece of ice in established shipping lanes.264 Finally, when the iceberg neared 
its destination, coastal authorities would be unprepared to receive it.265 Har-
vesters could then inadvertently drag icebergs to places that are not suitable 
destinations, causing severe and permanent environmental consequences.266 
Along with the environmental dangers, there would be other, equally ominous, 
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dangers in the absence of a coherent legal scheme, such as the political re-
sponses attempting to deflect accountability for gross unpreparedness and in-
ternational political responses.267 
B. The Case for Unilateral U.S. Action 
The United States should not passively wait to see if iceberg harvesting 
starts to occur.268 As global warming continues to accelerate, the already 
strained fresh water resources on which the United States relies are going to 
cease to exist sooner rather than later.269 Icebergs present a potentially viable 
and sustainable solution to this looming problem, but the overarching issue is 
whether that potential can be harnessed.270 Georges Mougin’s efforts over the 
past forty years demonstrate how difficult it is to make something seemingly 
far-fetched into something common and prevalent.271 Federal involvement ap-
pears to be the most reasonable way to determine whether iceberg harvesting is 
possible, and if it is, whether it is really a good idea.272 As the domestic and 
international need for new sources of fresh water accelerates, it becomes pro-
gressively more clear that the United States and the international community 
cannot wait to see if iceberg harvesting is a viable solution—we must find out 
now.273 
As the most powerful and influential nation in the world, U.S. interven-
tion carries the potential to incite a broader international conversation.274 Fur-
ther, if the United States chooses a wait-and-see strategy, it risks allowing legal 
uncertainty to prevent the emergence and development of a potentially rich 
natural resource industry.275 Instead, the United States should force the conver-
sation now—with foreign governments, private industry and technical and sci-
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entific parties.276 Although the United States can only control its own citizens 
and sovereign jurisdictions, its international reach and its existing presence in 
Antarctica are already so extensive that a federal law controlling iceberg har-
vesting would have a significant impact on the global stage.277 More simply 
stated, if the United States were to act now, unilaterally, it could stimulate an-
swers to the legal, technical, scientific and practical uncertainties that currently 
stand in the way of iceberg harvesting.278 
A national iceberg harvesting regime would also enable the United States 
to control the development of the industry.279 The basic functions of such a 
regime would be the establishment of permitting and licensing requirements, 
enforceable restrictions to licensure, enforceable environmental standards that 
are at least as robust as the environmental standards of the ATS and the UN-
CLOS and an enforcement mechanism.280 Within those broad categories, the 
regime would also need to clarify the requirements for renewal of permits and 
licenses over time, grounds for revocation and available legal action and reme-
dies in the event of violative acts.281 Such a regime could closely guide and 
monitor the industry to ensure that U.S. operators are fully supported, that 
there is uninterrupted delivery of this new water source and that the operations 
under its control are complying with international laws.282 
In conjunction with the control that such a scheme would create, are the 
incentivizing effects it would have.283 A federal law can ignite the initial stages 
of the industry’s development and the initial stages of an international treaty.284 
If the United States, with its role as a global leader, demonstrated to the rest of 
the international community that it took iceberg harvesting seriously, it could 
possibly generate international involvement and jumpstart an iceberg harvest-
ing industry.285 Further, as has been the case with deep seabed mining and 
space exploration, federal support—both legal and financial—can provide the 
impetus for technological development and increased private investment.286 
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A proactive approach would also enable the government to utilize its vast 
wealth of resources to ascertain more expeditiously whether or not iceberg 
harvesting is a realistic and practical endeavor.287 Further, if the United States 
gets out ahead of this industry, it stands to position itself as the global leader, 
which can create financially lucrative opportunities for private industry and 
enable the government to shape the international conversation, if and when 
that time comes.288 The government could then control the establishment of 
industry best-practice standards, ensure compliance with permitting require-
ments and environmental safeguards, generate tax revenue and otherwise facil-
itate the development, legitimacy and practicality of an industry that could 
have substantial effects on the well-being of humanity and the environment.289 
1. A New Federal Iceberg Harvesting Law 
One regulatory option for creating a federal iceberg harvesting regime 
would be for Congress to pass a new law that is specifically tailored to iceberg 
harvesting.290 In enacting such a law, Congress would be wise to use its expe-
rience with the DSHMRA as a model to design and implement a novel iceberg 
harvesting regime.291 A law modeled after the DSHMRA, which also accounts 
for its shortcomings, would enable the United States to act unilaterally, while 
concurrently promoting an international iceberg harvesting treaty.292 
There are several benefits to enacting a new law instead of folding ice-
berg harvesting into an existing law or federal agency.293 At the outset, Con-
gress would be able to tailor the law.294 The process would also yield a great 
deal of research, which, regardless of the outcome, would be valuable.295 It 
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would provide a much deeper wealth of information and knowledge about ice-
berg harvesting than what currently exists.296 Further, whereas incorporating 
iceberg harvesting regulation into an existing law would likely involve a rela-
tively quiet, uneventful administrative process, passing a new natural resources 
law could generate a large amount of domestic and international attention.297 
Although there are laudable advantages to the enactment of a new, nar-
rowly tailored iceberg harvesting law, there are nonetheless political realities 
that might make it impractical.298 Over the past several years, Congress has 
suffered from such severe partisan brinksmanship that it has required at least 
two last minute budget deals and even shut down the federal government for 
sixteen days.299 As such, it appears impractical to expect either party in either 
house to gather the resolve to research, negotiate and pass a law to facilitate 
and control a natural resource industry that does not yet exist.300 
2. A U.S. Coast Guard Iceberg Harvesting Authority 
In light of the practical impediments that stand in the way of the passage 
of a new iceberg harvesting law by Congress, the most logical and practical 
approach to regulating iceberg harvesting unilaterally—and perhaps the most 
efficient and expedient way—would be to incorporate it into existing federal 
laws and agencies, thereby using existing grants of statutory power to create 
the regime.301 Although there are several potential destinations, the most fitting 
appears to be the U.S. Coast Guard.302 The Coast Guard is the nation’s “lead-
ing maritime law enforcement agency . . . .”303 It is deployed all over the 
world, including its well-established presence in Antarctica, has the statutory 
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authority to incorporate and run an iceberg harvesting regime304 and has a long 
track record of working in conjunction with other public agencies and the pri-
vate sector to create positive environmental change.305 
The Coast Guard has the power and the responsibility to administer and 
enforce “all . . . [f]ederal laws on, under, and over the high seas . . .” and the 
power to promulgate and enforce regulations that promote the safety of life 
and property on the high seas.306 It is charged with developing, establishing, 
maintaining and operating aids to maritime navigation, icebreaking facilities 
and rescue facilities.307 Further, it has a more specific statutory duty to main-
tain and enforce the Antarctica Conservation Act (“ACA”)—a responsibility it 
shares with the National Science Foundation and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration.308 
The regulation of iceberg appropriation would seem to be the type of situ-
ation—an issue unforeseen by Congress or the ATS that nonetheless needs to 
be dealt with constructively—that led to Congress’ broad grant of statutory 
authority to the Coast Guard.309 The ATS purports to apply to anything below 
sixty degrees South Latitude,310 yet, because of the combination of the sover-
eignty claim freeze under Article IV of the ATS and the UNCLOS territorial 
water law,311 it appears impossible for the ATS to enact an iceberg harvesting 
regime.312 That would not, however, foreclose the Coast Guard from enacting 
the proposed regulation, because Congress used the language “consistent 
with,” in the ACA.313 The Coast Guard thus has the legal authority to institute 
and operate an iceberg acquisition and control program in Antarctic waters as 
part of a larger iceberg harvesting regulatory scheme, and although it would 
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not directly fall within the scope of the ATS, it would be consistent with the 
general policy thrust of the ATS to preserve Antarctica as a natural resource.314 
Beyond Antarctic waters, the Coast Guard can take advantage of its inter-
national maritime presence and its continuing global operations to protect the 
marine environment, keep a watchful eye on any tows in progress, enforce op-
erational requirements and respond to mid-ocean problems that might arise.315 
In fact, the Coast Guard already performs similar monitoring activities in fur-
therance of its enforcement duties under the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Mora-
torium Protection Act316 and the High Seas Fishing Compliance Act of 1995.317 
Thus, it should not be overly complex, logistically, for the Coast Guard to 
monitor the shipping lanes and to enforce the permits that it grants to any tow-
ing operation licensed out of the United States, seeking U.S. sanction or pro-
tection, or hoping to do business domestically.318 This presence will also ena-
ble the Coast Guard to ensure that tows in progress do not interfere with any 
other international high seas laws.319 
Within these various and diverse grants of statutory authority, the Coast 
Guard appears to have the legal flexibility to design and develop a regulatory 
scheme for iceberg harvesting that could address the most pressing needs pre-
sented by the current legal vacuum—achieving facilitative progress, providing 
continued support, instituting regulatory control and enforcing restrictions and 
punishments.320 In conjunction with its large maritime fleet and its well-
established presence in Antarctica, the Coast Guard should be considered the 
obvious choice as the governmental agency to regulate iceberg harvesting.321 
CONCLUSION 
The conventional sources of freshwater that modern society has relied on 
for the past centuries will soon become insufficient to support the global need. 
The world is facing a serious water crisis and it is time for the most advanced 
nations to address the situation proactively. Icebergs might hold one of the so-
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lutions. Unfortunately, the potential for harvesting icebergs as a freshwater 
source has not yet been adequately explored: technically; scientifically; envi-
ronmentally; or economically. The seemingly farfetched notion of towing mas-
sive pieces of ice across the ocean presents its own challenges in terms of per-
suading nations, entrepreneurs, scientists, and individuals that it is an idea 
worth pursuing. It is also the case that, as this Note demonstrates, icebergs and 
iceberg harvesting exist in a legal vacuum, and that the vacuum itself could be 
a significant deterrent to the development of an iceberg harvesting industry. 
The United States should act unilaterally to create and implement a feder-
al iceberg harvesting scheme. A reasoned analysis of the international laws that 
could touch on iceberg appropriation and towing—two critical components of 
any iceberg harvesting operation—leads to the conclusion that icebergs are res 
nullius, and thus free for the taking. The United States stands in the unique 
position of having the legal freedom to act unilaterally without offending the 
global community, and in a way that potentially motivates a broader multilat-
eral treaty encompassing iceberg harvesting. The United States should thus act 
unilaterally, and in so doing, breathe life into the dormant conversation about 
iceberg harvesting. At this time, the most logical approach would be for the 
U.S. Coast Guard to institute and promulgate a regulatory scheme because a 
novel federal law is unrealistic in the current political environment. It is not 
clear that iceberg harvesting is either possible or viable, but unless a major su-
per power like the United States acts, we will not soon find out. 
